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(administrative and fiscal one, in particular), regional structures should be 
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focuses on the applicability of personal income taxes and  corporate taxes at a 
local level. The pros and cons of using the two types of taxes as sources of 
revenues to municipalities are analysed, the practice of different countries around 
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the thesis that taxes on labour incomes should be approached as local or parallel 
taxes, while there are no grounds for including corporate taxes in the category of 
local or parallel taxes. 
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Introduction 
 
he effectiveness of financial decentralization is a consequence of having 
competences and financial resources reasonably shared by central and 
local governments and directly depends on the own revenues of territorial 
structures (Zahariev, 2012; Krastev, 2018). ‘Therefore, the dependence (or 
independence) of a local government on (from) the central one is largely 
determined by the ability of each municipality to accumulate sufficient own 
revenues to be expended freely for public benefits in public interest’ (Pavlova-
T 
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Bunova, 2018, p. 5). The choice of a specific form of local taxation is essential 
for designing a decentralized tax system that is based on the principles of 
regional revenue autonomy and therefore requires an in-depth analysis. 
Issues related to the well-grounded attribution of a tax to the powers of 
the central government or to the responsibilities of local government bodies 
determine the relevance of this paper. The object of the analysis is to examine 
personal and corporate income taxes as potential sources of local revenue, while 
its subject relates to the effects which the revenues from those taxes would have 
on the financial autonomy of local authorities. The main objective of the paper is 
to determine which level of the budget system personal and corporate taxes 
correspond to. Based on the defined object, subject and objective of the 
research, the following research thesis is formulated: The analysis of the practical 
and theoretical aspects of personal income taxes leads to the conclusion that in 
contrast to corporate taxes, they can be approached as an adequate source of 
local revenue1. 
 
 
1. An Optimistic Approach to Using Personal Income Taxes  
at a Local Level 
 
The personal and corporate income taxes are a source of significant 
revenue to the budget. Provided that property taxes are not profitable, the 
question of the possibility of using income taxes as a local source of income is of 
paramount importance2. 
 
                                                          
1 Note: Issues related to the comparative analysis (through data provided by the 
statistics) of current tax efficiency and profitability (respectively, the benefits and costs) 
of the existing model of financing different administrative units are not included within the 
scope of this paper. Such an analysis and testing of simulation models for financial 
modeling of the effects which the tax reforms are expected to have on Bulgarian 
municipalities are clearly needed next steps (after justified attribution of a tax to the 
powers of the central government or to the responsibilities of local governments) in the 
process of designing an efficient decentralized tax system.  
2 Note: The basic characteristics of personal and corporate income taxes are: 1) 
they are neutral in terms of price levels since they are not included in the prices of goods 
and services; 2) they are personal and therefore taxation can be organized in a way that 
takes into account the individual characteristics of the taxpayers; 3) they are an 
instrument of the discretionary fiscal policy; 4) they can be used for specific purposes, 
foe example, to encourage employment in certain regions; to promote (or limit) certain 
costs incurred by businesses; to encourage savings in certain assets; to affect the activity 
of monopolistic and oligopolistic structures; 5) progressive taxation renders personal 
income taxes a typical example of the operation of built-in budget stabilizers. See. Prof. 
Brusarski, R., A. Zahariev, G. Manliev. (2015); Financial theory, Veliko Turnovo: Faber; 
Milinov, V. and M. Marinov (2017); Taxation Technique. Svishtov: Tsenov Academic 
Publishing House. 
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Personal income taxes are levied on labour incomes and capital gains 
from trading in securities, currency, rental income, interest, dividends, etc. In light 
of the objective of this paper, our analysis is focused on the possibility to use 
revenues generated from personal income taxes at the level of municipality. We 
should note, though, that this is an adequate source of local revenue since it 
meets fully or partially the optimality criteria (See Table 1). 
In the first place, individuals, in most cases, reside and work on territories 
that are subject to the same jurisdiction. Personal income taxes can therefore be 
approached as a payment for the ‘common benefits’ provided by local 
governments. Applying this tax at a local level helps avoid exporting the tax 
burden and make sure that the taxpayers are also the users of public benefits, 
which is essential for economic efficiency.3 It is precisely from the perspective of 
efficiency that another point should be made - income taxes (including from 
labour) are usually visible to payers, which forces local governments to improve 
their expenditure accountability. In order to be objective in our analysis, though, 
we should acknowledge the fact that personal income taxes are not as visible as 
property taxes. This statement takes into account the fact that all due taxes on 
wages and salaries are usually deducted by employers, while the payments due 
for ownership rights (or change of ownership rights, etc.) on property are made 
in person. 
A fair approach to the regional applicability of the analyzed tax requires 
that we take into account the fact that gained receipts reflect the dynamics of the 
economic situation within a region relatively accurately, i.e. the tax base is elastic. 
During an economic upsurge, labour incomes tend to increase due to the growing 
demand for labour force (i.e. in real terms) and due to inflationary dynamics which 
is typical of periods of economic growth (i.e. in nominal terms). Positive changes 
in personal incomes result in increased revenue generated from personal income 
taxes and thus encourage local governments to manage their own regional 
resources in a responsible manner. In contrast, transfers from the central 
government that are not related to the economic situation in the municipality or, 
more often than not, are inversely dependent on the situation, create conditions 
for unreasonable expending of resources due to fiscal illusions. This is another 
argument in favour of the economic efficiency of local taxes on labour income. 
 
                                                          
3 Note: For further reference about the relation between fiscal decentralization 
and cost-effectiveness, see: Tanzi, V. (1995). Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A 
Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects. Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics, pp. 295-316. For For further reference about 
the effects of introducing changes in tax practice in different regions worldwide, see: 
Naydenov, L. (2012). Tax autonomy of local authorities - theoretical arguments and 
national practice, Varna: Steno. 
Economics 21    2/2019 20 
Table 1 
Local use of personal income taxes 
Optimality criteria for local 
taxation 
Comments 
The tax burden is borne 
by the residents of the 
region 
Most often, individuals live and work in the same 
municipality. Therefore, the local use of personal 
income tax prevents tax exporting. 
Easy administration of 
taxes 
In most cases, individuals live and work in the same 
municipality, and the tax liability is withheld at work. 
The local administration of personal income tax is 
therefore a realistic option. 
Taxes do not impede the 
functioning of the 
domestic market 
Labour income taxes do not affect the performance 
of the domestic market and pose no barriers to 
international trade. 
 
In the second place, the administration of the tax in question at a regional 
level can be defined as a realistic and achievable goal. Such a statement takes 
into account the fact that personal income taxes are deducted by employers and 
is based on the assumption that tax-payers live and work in the same jurisdiction. 
The taxation of freelancers’ incomes and other sources of income outside 
payrolls is probably more difficult, but 'it is no more problematic to local authorities 
than it is to the central government, and therefore there is no reason to believe 
that the percentage of the funds collected through a decentralized  tax systems 
would be lower than the percentage of funds collected through a centralized one’ 
(Bahl and Cyan, 2010, p.6). The issues discussed so far can be approached from 
another perspective. In comparative terms, the costs incurred for the regional 
administration of property taxes are lower than the costs incurred for the 
collection and control of direct personal income taxes. This argument is 
commonly used against the practice of local administration of taxes. 
Nevertheless, a similar argument should be approached with certain criticism for 
at least two reasons. On the one hand, it does not take into account the recurrent 
expenditures incurred by administrative tax offices on the tax revaluation of 
property (due to changes in market prices or in other circumstances). Those 
expenditures should not be underestimated, since including them in the analysis 
will render the administration of income taxes similar to that of property taxes. On 
the other hand, revenues generated from income taxes are much higher than the 
revenues generated from property taxes, therefore, the ratios between 
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administrative expenditures and the nominal revenues generated from the two 
types of taxes are similar4. 
Parallel taxation is another solution to potential administrative problems 
in the collection and control of income taxes (including those on labour income). 
There are two options for organising this type of distribution of powers and they 
are quite similar in content. The application of the first one implies that income 
taxes are levied both at a local and at a national level. In this situation, local 
governments apply a uniform (proportional) rate to the tax base which the central 
government has defined and proceeds are collected by the central government. 
The second option refers to levying a surcharge on the fixed national income tax 
rate. The specific amount of the surcharge may vary in the different jurisdictions 
within the limits set by the central government or it may be fixed by the regions. 
It is recommended that the percentage of the surcharge be proportionate and not 
progressive in order to avoid possible tax exportation. 
In the third place, the use of personal income taxes as a local source of 
revenues does not impede the functioning of the domestic market and is not 
related to international trade. 
 
 
2. Potential Disadvantages of Using Personal Income Taxes 
at a Local Level 
 
The arguments in favour of the local administration of personal income 
taxes are not generally accepted. There are several points of criticism to such 
sharing of powers. 
On the one hand, it should be borne in mind that the personal income tax 
is a typical instrument of a national stabilization and redistribution policy and is 
therefore inappropriate for use by local governments. Stancho Cholakov, for 
example, notes: ‘It is advisable that personal income taxes be collected by central 
governments, since income is one of the most appropriate objects of taxation, 
not only in terms of yield ... but also because it is recognized as being the most 
comprehensive tool for measuring the economic and social status of income 
holders. The personal income tax is therefore A GOOD instance of fair taxation’ 
(Cholakov, 1936, p. 156). This view is logical (and in accordance with the tradition 
established by R. Musgrave, it is accepted as an axiom in the theory of fiscal 
federalism), but should nevertheless be approached with more skepticism. 
Beyond a strictly dogmatic interpretation, the statement that local authorities 
cannot be expected to be involved in stabilisation raises certain objections. As a 
                                                          
4 Note: The practice of the United Kingdom proves the validity of the 
considerations above since the relative costs (i.e. the cost/income ratio) of administering 
income taxes in the country are lower than those of collecting and controlling property 
taxes. In addition, the property tax rate is one of the highest in the world. See Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA). (2004). Reviewing the Case for a 
Local Income Tax. London.  
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matter of fact, in the presence of regionally asymmetric shocks or in the context 
of small open economies with a floating exchange rate, a central fiscal policy is 
hardly effective and there is definitely room for territorially constrained growth 
incentives5. The issue of social policy can also be considered from a position that 
differs from the commonly accepted one. 
Redistribution through progressive income taxation is clearly within the 
prerogatives of central governments, but the administration and control of the 
appropriate targeting of social assistance for the disadvantaged may be 
implemented by local authorities since they have more accurate and adequate 
information on their real needs. Provided that governments levy a progressive 
income tax while local authorities apply proportional taxes, there is no reason to 
believe that regional intervention limits the effectiveness of the stabilisation and 
redistribution policy which is implemented by the central government. A similar 
manner of organizing taxation may be advisable as it does not compromise the 
impact of built-in automatic fiscal stabilizers. 
Another reasonable argument against the use of personal income tax by 
local authorities is the statement that the place where a tax is paid is not always 
the place where public goods financed through that tax are consumed. Of course, 
people can work and live in different regions (McLure, 1999). If tax revenues are 
accumulated locally (i.e. by employers), there will certainly be a discrepancy 
between incurred costs and received benefits. We need to emphasise again that 
some locally provided public goods (education, healthcare) generate ‘common 
benefits’ and it is therefore necessary to ensure that the consumption of those 
benefits is pegged to income taxes. That would be difficult if personal income 
taxes are collected by employers. What is more, this type of taxation creates 
conditions for exporting the tax burden, thus reducing further the efficiency of the 
distribution of scarce resources. In theory, revenues generated through income 
taxes that are collected by employers may be expended by the regions where 
people live. The administration of such a mechanism, however, raises other 
issues, such as the lack of incentives for efficient collection of receipts and 
potential delays in the payment of amounts due. On the other hand, taxes 
collected through income tax forms may take into account the residence of 
taxpayers. Such an option (used in conjunction with the collection of income 
taxes by employers) is in compliance with the principle that paid taxes must 
                                                          
5 Note: In a situation of regionally asymmetric shocks (for example, the impact 
of oil prices on two districts – one being an importer and the other one – an exporter), 
there is no harmonized national economic cycle. In this situation, one of the regions might 
be subject to inflationary pressures, while at the same time the other jurisdiction might be 
facing unemployment. Clearly, a central fiscal policy is ineffective in this case. The same 
conclusion may apply to small countries with open economies and a floating exchange 
rate, because in such cases the central fiscal policy will affect the price of the national 
currency. Thus, during a recession, the value of the national currency will rise, which will 
result in lower exports and increasing imports. A local fiscal policy is possible and even 
advisable provided that it bears no effect to the exchange rate.  
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correspond to received benefits. Hence the conclusion that when the tax 
collection process is appropriately organized, personal income taxes may be 
expended locally. This is further supported by the fact that individuals are more 
likely to live and work within the same jurisdiction. 
As we know, in the budgeting process (central or local), the revenue side 
is based on projected, expected revenues. Therefore, tax revenue predictability 
is essential for building a realistic budget. Revenues from personal income taxes, 
however, are difficult to forecast because of the highly resilient base. The 
problem is further exacerbated when local authorities have broad tax powers and 
the proceeds from personal income taxes constitute a significant share of those 
revenues. In this context, an unexpected decline in regional economic activity 
poses a risk to the funding of basic local public goods. Central government 
support is therefore essential for expanding the tax powers of local governments 
in terms of collecting personal income taxes. The specific organization of 
relations between the central government and regional authorities must prevent 
any moral hazards that could undermine local responsibility or accountability. 
Practice in Scandinavian countries shows that ambitious as it could be, this goal 
is still achievable6. 
The difficulty of accurately forecasting revenues from personal income 
taxes should not be exaggerated. This thesis is supported by the general 
macroeconomic fact that, in the short term, wages are not flexible in terms of 
declining, i.e. a sharp decrease in the revenues from collected personal income 
taxes in not very likely.  Undoubtedly, the existence of minimum wages, the 
presence of trade unions and medium and long-term employment contracts 
reduce the elasticity of the tax base. On the other hand, there is no obvious 
reason to define regional forecasts as wrong by default.  
In the context of fiscal autonomy and local freedom in defining tax rates, 
there is always the risk of unfair tax competition and tax-driven migration. We 
need to emphasize that high tax rates, when coupled with high quality local public 
goods, ensure fiscal equivalence and do not encourage migration7. 
                                                          
6 Note: In Denmark and Sweden, central governments collect revenues from 
personal income taxes and subsequently distribute accumulated funds to local authorities 
in accordance with the budget forecast (rather than on the basis of reals amounts 
collected). In Danish practice, any difference between planned and actually collected 
revenues on the territory of a region is approached as a loan from the government to the 
province or vice versa. This loan is repayable within two years, with idue nterests. In 
Sweden, the difference between estimated and real revenues is added to or respectively, 
deducted from the subsidy paid off in two years. 
7 Note: Clearly, in terms of tax base mobility, property taxation is less risky than 
income taxation. This issue is analyzed by J. Spry. The author suggests that a number 
of US states prefer property taxes to income taxes because the latter motivate the 
migration of one particular group of households. These are households whose incomes 
are high enough, but the value of real estate owned is relatively low, i.e the cited author 
points out the importance of the nominal income / price index of the property as a factor 
for migration. See: Spry, J. (2005). The Effects of Fiscal Competition on Local Property 
and Income Tax Reliance. Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy. Vol. 5. No. 1. pр.1-
19. 
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There are further arguments that raise doubt about the efficiency of using 
personal income taxes at a local level. For example, it is an indisputable fact that 
taxable bases vary widely on different territories and therefore local fiscal 
autonomy results in growing regional fiscal imbalances. To support the thesis of 
our research, we should note that the issues of horizontal imbalances: 
1) are in the prerogatives of the central government and 
2) may be resolved through transfer policy instruments.  
Another tax-related issue that deserves more attention refers to the scope 
of local taxation. It is recommended that the tax base should include any incomes 
of individuals, and not just those from labour. The administration of capital gains 
faces considerable difficulties, mainly in terms of the control on the fair and true 
declaration of incomes (for example, from trading in securities, currencies and 
other taxable assets). Furthermore, capital income is often generated from a 
source operating outside the region and, therefore, a local tax on such income 
does not comply with the principle of levying taxes that are commensurate with 
received benefits. It is therefore worth considering the possibility to levy different 
taxes on different types of income. Such a solution has two major aspects: Firstly, 
taxes which are easy to administer on a ‘local’ basis (for example, real estate 
rental tax, property tax on commercial real estate, or taxes levied on sole 
proprietorships) are decentralized by providing extensive powers to regions, i.e. 
tax rates are defined locally. Secondly, taxes on income generated from 
dividends, interest, trading in securities, currencies, precious metals, etc. are 
collected centrally (by applying a common tax base and tax rates). We should 
note that a similar approach to collecting taxes on income that is not generated 
from wages or salaries would be in conflict with the principle of equal taxation of 
income from different sources (in practice, this principle is often violated by tax 
legislation, both in developed and developing countries) and incur additional 
(including transaction) costs on taxpayers.  
D. King (2007) suggests a different solution, its primary advantage being 
ensuring the fiscal autonomy of the regions. The author recommends that local 
authorities levy capital income with one and the same tax rate that is equal to the 
average tax rate levied locally on incomes (this implies that local authorities will 
define independently the tax rate on labour income and employ a uniform tax rate 
for capital income) and then distribute the revenue generated from taxes on 
capital income among regions according to the size of their population. The 
objective is to ensure equal receipts per capita. Applying King’s solution, 
however, would complicate the tax system and requires cooperation between 
regions which, in some cases, is not possible.  
The issues arising from the central regulation of payments are not 
impossible to resolve. They refer to formulating adequate and straightforward 
legislative provisions that are based on the principles that labours earned through 
labour should be negotiated and that capital incomes should be regulated by the 
market.    
Hence, we could make the following conclusions and recommendations 
about the possibility to collect taxes on personal incomes at a local level: 
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 Taxes on incomes earned from labour meet the requirements for 
using them at a regional level. As a rule, they do not encourage tax 
export or impede the functioning of the single domestic market and 
can be administered at a reasonable cost; 
 Taxes on capital income are not relevant to the domestic or the 
international trade of the country, but their collection and exercising 
control on the fair payment of debts are difficult. At the same time, 
some of those taxes are not in compliance with the principle that 
collected taxes correspond to the benefits gained from the 
consumption of public goods. 
 
 
3. Using Personal Income Taxes at a Local Level -  
the Practice 
 
The findings of the research provide some guidelines for designing a 
decentralized tax system and define its characteristics (in terms of personal 
income taxes). Nevertheless, it would be impossible to make a definitive 
judgement without studying the practice of other countries (Bahl and Cyan, 
2010). It is worth noting that the use of personal income taxes as a source of 
local revenue is a typical feature of the tax systems in countries with developed 
market economies. The models through which regional authorities have access 
to the receipts from personal income taxes range from full local autonomy to 
sharing of receipts between the government and the territorial units. 
In the USA, regional (state) governments are authorised to decide 
whether to expend revenues from personal income taxes and to define the tax 
base and the tax rates. In terms of the tax base, most states adopt the definition 
of gross income that is used by the federal government and subsequently 
formulate their own tax base. In general, the tax is proportional, but some regions 
apply progressive taxation. An interesting fact is that in 11 states, third-level 
public authority may levy surcharges on the regional (state) basis. Canadian 
provinces are also authorised to collect personal income taxes (including the right 
to determine the tax rates), but the administration and scope of the tax base are 
within the prerogatives of the central government (except in Quebec, where the 
tax base and the administration of taxes are a local responsibility). In Switzerland, 
regional authorities (cantons) charge a personal income tax within the limits 
prescribed by the constitution and define the tax rate. Similar to the USA, taxes 
can be proportional or progressive, and third-level public sector units (the 
communes) can set surcharges on the tax rate defined for a particular canton. 
We should note that regions in Switzerland receive as subsidies a share of the 
revenues generated at the federal level from the central personal income tax. 
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Table 2 
Options for using the personal income tax as a local source of revenue 
Characteristics 
of the tax 
systm 
Local 
autonomy 
Mixed approach 
Centralized 
allocation 
The USA & 
Switzerland 
Scandinavi
an 
countries 
Spain Germany 
CEE 
(Central 
and 
Eastern 
Europe) 
Regional tax 
rates 
YES YES YES NO NO 
Regional tax 
base 
YES NO 
In some 
regions 
NO NO 
Regional 
administration 
YES NO 
In some 
regions 
YES 
In some 
countrie
s 
Regional or 
local tax 
surcharges 
YES YES - NO YES 
Shared taxes 
YES 
(Switzerland) 
YES NO YES YES 
 
According to the so-called Scandinavian model, the administration of 
taxes is the responsibility of a single central administration (there are no local 
ones), and the rate of personal income taxes is defined by the regions. In 
principle, the rules for determining the tax base are formulated by the 
government, and the latter may also set limits on the amount of the tax base. In 
Norway, for example, there is an upper tax threshold and most provinces apply 
that maximum. In Sweden and Denmark, the courts define the taxable rate 
independently. The practice is different in Germany- the regions (länder) are fully 
responsible for the administration of personal income taxes, but are not 
authorized to define tax rates or the tax base. Generated revenues, however, are 
shared between the provinces and the central government. The shared tax 
system is also used in the administration of personal income taxes in Austria, 
Belgium, Portugal and some other countries. 
Spain is an interesting case as no uniform approach is employed in terms 
of the powers of regional authorities. Some provinces have guaranteed tax 
autonomy (its parameters being close to those in the United States), while others 
are only authorised to determine the tax rate. A similar approach is quite 
reqsonable, provided that not all provinces have the necessary administrative or 
financial resources to handle the responsibilities of tax decentralization. Two of 
the characteristics of the administration of personal income taxes in CEE 
countries are the surcharges on centrally defined tax rates and the tax base 
and/or the sharing of receipts. In developing countries, the practice of local 
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autonomy with respect to personal income tax is an exception, rather than a rule. 
These practical and theoretical aspects of the issue of local personal 
income taxes provide the necessary basis for making a final assessment. 
Evidence from applied tax practices in different countries confirm the findings of 
the conducted theoretical analysis, hence we can make the following 
conclusions: 
 Personal income taxes are treated as local taxes (and exclusively as 
local ones in the US and Switzerland). Nevertheless, there are certain 
restrictions on regional tax autonomy (predominantly in Canada and 
Norway) which are considered to be appropriate; 
 Personal income tax can be used as a form of parallel taxation (as it 
is the case in Central and East European countries). Such a 
compromise is highly recommended for countries which are going 
through fiscal decentralization and substantial vertical fiscal 
imbalances at the same time. Personal income taxes may also be 
charged to generate revenues that are shared; 
 It would be impossible to apply a uniform approach to the taxation of 
personal income. Some of these taxes (for instance, those levied on 
income generated from the rent of property) may be collected at a 
regional level. If this is the case, it would be appropriate to have the 
the tax base, the administration and the upper limit of tax rates defined 
by the central government. The latter implies parallel taxation or 
sharing of tax-generated revenues. Profit taxes collected from sole 
proprietorship may (under certain conditions) be administered at a 
regional level as typical local charges.   
 
 
4. Administration of Corporate Income Taxes at a Local Level - 
Opportunities and Disadvantages 
 
The issue of including corporate income tax within the scope of local tax 
powers does not raise any theoretical debate. The view that business taxes (i.e. 
taxes on corporate profit and/or on specific types of revenue) should not be used 
by regional authorities is generally accepted and justified by the fact that all 
potential negatives of taxes on personal incomes are thus materialised. In terms 
of the criteria adopted in the paper for the optimization of tax separation between 
the vertical levels of the public sector, there are a few points to emphasise. 
In the first place, charging corporate income taxes is in conflict with the 
principle that the amount of payments made should correspond to received 
benefits. Clearly, legal entities that consume local public goods have to pay 
appropriate charges or prices for the services provided by the municipality. This 
is the case in all developed and developing countries. It is impossible, however, 
to consider the so-called ‘public benefits’ an argument in favour of corporate 
income taxes. This does not mean that companies do not benefit from the high 
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quality of locally funded goods such as primary and secondary education, 
emergency medical care or fire protection, rather, it emphasizes the fact that 
such benefits are indirect and largely affect the well-being of physical persons. 
The previous section of the paper therefore proposed that personal income taxes 
could be collected at a local level. 
 
Table 3 
Using corporate income taxes at a local level 
Optimality criteria for local 
taxation  
Comments 
The burden of taxation is 
borne by the residents of 
the region 
The local administration of corporate income taxes 
allows the exportation of the tax burden. 
Easy tax administration 
Substantial administrative potential is required to 
control the correct accounting of company 
operations and to accurately identify the 
geographical source of income. 
Taxes do not impede the 
functioning of the 
domestic market 
Charging corporate income taxes, as a rule, does 
not affect the functioning of the domestic market and 
does not create barriers to international trade. 
 
In the second place, the issue of local autonomy in the regulation of 
corporate taxes relates to the lack of a direct relation between the revenues 
generated from those taxes and the benefits that are consumed, as well as to the 
export of the tax burden. Taxes charged on corporate profit (all things being 
equal) lead to lower income of company owners, have a negative effect on wages 
and salaries, and result in higher prices. A major argument against the local 
administration of corporate profit taxes is that shareholders, workers and buyers 
often live and work outside the territory of the tax creditor (i.e. the municipality, in 
this case). It is therefore logical to conclude that regional powers on collecting 
corporate taxes result in exported tax burden.  
In the third place, a major feature of local tax autonomy is the right to 
determine tax rates. Within the context of competition between regions, that right 
can encourage the unjustified reduction of tax rates, thus leading to a decline in 
the volume of locally provided public goods below the demand for them.8 It is 
worth noting that the freedom to charge autonomous tax rates renders the 
implementation of policies of the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ type highly attractive, 
and encourages business entities to have their economic activity relocated 
                                                          
8 Note: The negative effects of local powers in regulating corporate income taxes 
have been the subject of numerous research works. For a thorough theoretical analysis 
and empirical verification, see: Graham, E. and P. Krugman (1989). Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States. Institute for International Economics. Washington. 
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somewhere else. Hence the conclusion that local tax autonomy, in terms of 
corporate profit taxes, results in inefficient allocation. Such a conclusion may not 
be fully applicable to situations in which a company strongly depends on its 
territorial location (for the extraction of raw materials, for example), yet this is 
rarely the case in practice (since although raw materials may be extracted on a 
specific territory, their processing and the production of final goods may take 
place somewhere else). 
There is another aspect of the issue of efficiency. As we already stated in 
this paper, the principles of taxation need to be ‘visible’, so that consumers of 
public goods (voters) could be aware of the costs for having those goods 
provided to them. Hence, we need to emphasise that: 
1. Corporate income taxes are charged anonymously with respect to 
average voters;  
2. The exportation of the tax burden to other regions complicates the 
process of making an informed choice; 
3. Cross-subsidization, which in this case is materialized through the 
taxes charged on businesses in order to provide benefits to individuals, further 
generates fiscal illusions; 
4. Such behavior ensures political benefits and is therefore a strategy 
preferred by the authorities. 
The above considerations prove that the lack of visibility in corporate 
income taxation discourages local accountability and responsibility.   
In the next place, business taxation entails high administrative costs. 
There are two major aspects of arising problems. On the one hand, significant 
administrative capacity is required to control the correct accounting of company 
operations. On the other hand, the administration of local corporate taxes 
requires accurate identification of the geographic source of income. The latter is 
practically impossible in cases when the company operates in more than one 
region and applies transfer pricing. From a theoretical point of view, one can 
argue in favour of an approach in which corporate income is taxed on a formula 
basis. It is assumed that the formula may reflect variables that relate to the 
sources of income (e.g. property, sales volumes/production, etc.), or taxes may 
be calculated as the weighted index of three main factors: salaries, assets and 
sales (Martinez-Vazques, 2007). Applying either of the approaches would be 
inappropriate, since they turn the taxation of corporate income into taxation of 
the elements included in the formula. The accurate calculation of the value of 
sales/production volumes, the value of property or of assets gives rise to several 
other issues. Furthermore, the relationship between the territorial location of the 
factors included in the formula and the generation of company profits is 
controversial (or at least inaccurate). A local corporate tax that is based on the 
registration of legal entities is completely unacceptable. Such an approach, in the 
absence of a formula for the inter-regional distribution of receipts, would be both 
unfair and ineffective as it would be in favour of large, fiscally sound, jurisdictions 
and would put in a disadvantageous position the other jurisdictions, thus 
exacerbating existing horizontal imbalances. 
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In the fifth place, local powers in terms of corporate income taxes as a 
rule do not affect the functioning of the domestic market or create barriers to 
international trade. An alternative statement would be the assumption that a 
jurisdiction may organize the taxation system it applies so as to function as a ‘tax 
haven’ attracting corporate investment. Such a possibility should be considered 
unlikely, and in any case, the problem can be solved through legislative 
measures. 
Using corporate income taxes at a local level also has other 
disadvantages, including the fact the analyzed taxes are an instrument of the 
government's fiscal policy, which is indirectly related to the redistribution of 
income; the revenue generated from them is rather cyclical and unstable; the 
progressive income tax acts as an automatic budget stabilizer; the tax base is 
different on the different territories. All these arguments in favour of waiving the 
regional corporate income tax are, to some extent, justified. At the same time, 
there is no explicit need for detailed comments since they have already been 
analyzed with reference to personal income taxes. 
In terms of the three optimality criteria for the allocation of powers, the 
following conclusions can be made:  
 Corporate income taxes do not meet the requirements for taxation 
in accordance with the accumulated benefits or for easy 
administration; 
 Corporate income taxes are neutral in terms of the functioning of 
the domestic market, but they are an important element of the 
central fiscal policy. 
 
 
5. The Use of Corporate Income Taxes at a Local Level  
in Practice 
 
Due to the considerations listed above, local governments would be 
expected to avoid the use of corporate income tax. The practice, however, is in 
serious conflict with a similar recommendation. As a matter of fact, corporate 
income taxes generate local revenue in a number of developing countries, incl. 
Mexico, China, the USA, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Italy, Japan, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Belgium, etc. Different regions in these countries have different 
tax powers – they are wider in the USA and in Canada, while in Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark and Finland revenues from taxes are shared, yet the 
factors which govern the organisation of their tax systems are similar.  
The main arguments in favour of applying corporate taxes locally can be 
summarized in three main groups. Firstly, personal property taxes and personal 
income taxes are visible, highly tangible and therefore unpopular. Central 
subsidies, on the other hand, are often insufficient to satisfy local demand for 
public goods (in terms of their quantity and quality). Regional authorities therefore 
give priority to corporate income taxes as a source of revenue. Secondly, 
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corporate income taxes generate significant revenue with higher elasticity to the 
economic environment, compared to the elasticity of the revenue generated from 
personal property taxes and personal income taxes. Thirdly, since ‘no one is 
quite sure what the impact of those taxes is, it is easy to assume or claim that 
they are paid by non-residents’ (Bahl and Bird, 2008, p.23).  Hence, the factors 
that have been identified as underlying the practice using corporate taxes locally 
should be considered ungrounded, imposed by political considerations and being 
the consequence of the inoptimal organization of vertical financial relationships 
(for example, difficult access to capital markets or insufficient volumes of 
government subsidies).  
The fact that the motives behind regional corporate taxation are 
subjective does not imply easily rejecting the implementation of such a practice. 
Provided that municipalities have access to the revenues generates from taxes 
on corporate profit, it would be more logical to levy taxes on production or sales 
growth rates (Bird, 1999). Some financial theorists also discuss the possibility to 
replace the corporate taxes which are currently levied at a regional level with 
specific taxes on corporate revenue. One of the proposals is to levy a Value-
Added Income Tax (VAIT) on production (Bird, 2009). It is necessary to specify, 
though, that companies combine the production factors they purchase or lease 
to create a product or service whose utility is higher than the incurred costs. 
Therefore, provided that the value added by labour is the cost of labour (wages 
and other types of remuneration), and the value added by capital (own and 
borrowed) is expressed in the cost of capital, the taxable base of a value added 
income tax can be reduced to the positive difference between the revenues of a 
company and the costs it has made on purchasing labour and capital. This type 
of taxation is currently employed in Italian provinces and has three major 
advantages: 1) the tax is neutral and does not discriminate investment; 2) the tax 
base is less susceptible to erosion; 3) the tax is relatively sensitive to changes in 
the economic environment.9  
The theoretical arguments, currently existing practices of local corporate 
taxation, and the conducted analysis of possible tax innovations through VAIT 
can be summarised into the following major findings:  
 There are no grounds for assigning corporate income taxes to the 
groups of exclusively local, typically local or parallel taxes. Despite 
political and historical traditions, those taxes should either be charged 
by central governments only or be replaced with a Value Added 
Income Tax. In the second case, the value-added income tax can be 
interpreted as autonomous, but in order to limit the export of tax 
burden, central restrictions on tax bases and rates should be applied; 
 It is possible to have the revenue generated from corporate taxes 
shared between the central and the regional governments. A similar 
                                                          
9 Note: It must be objectively acknowledged that, logically, the value-added 
income tax (sometimes referred to as BVT - business value tax) is based on the idea of 
value added tax (VAT) and can therefore be attributed to the group of consumption taxes. 
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practice requires using a formula that takes into account the 
differences in the tax bases and the expenditures of the different 
regions. The strong emphasis on the equalizing nature of the 
revenues thus generated renders it necessary to predominantly use 
transfers instead of shared receipts.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In terms of Bulgarian practice, the analysis of the alternative sources of 
local revenue, as a basis of the financial autonomy of territorial units, leads to the 
following recommendations:  
First: Local governments can increase their own revenues by introducing 
the practice of charging parallel taxes on personal income from employment. 
Second. The organization of the taxes charged on personal income from 
employment should be improved to increase the powers of local authorities 
(minimum powers should include their right to determine the parallel tax 
surcharge within a centrally defined range). 
Third. Corporate income taxes should be excluded as an alternative 
source of local revenue, including from shared revenue. 
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